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Abstract
A major challenge in regulated health insurance markets is to mitigate risk selection potential. Risk selection can occur in the 
presence of unpriced risk heterogeneity, which refers to predictable variation in health care spending not reflected in either 
premiums by insurers or risk equalization payments. This paper examines unpriced risk heterogeneity within risk groups 
distinguished by the sophisticated Dutch risk equalization model of 2016. Our strategy is to combine the administrative data-
set used for estimation of the risk equalization model (n = 16.9 million) with information derived from a large health survey 
(n = 387k). The survey information allows for explaining and predicting residual spending of the risk equalization model. 
Based on the predicted residual spending, two metrics are used to indicate unpriced risk heterogeneity at the individual level 
and at the level of certain (risk) groups: the correlation coefficient between residual spending and predicted residual spending, 
and the mean absolute value of predicted residual spending. The analyses yield three main findings: (1) the health survey 
information is able to explain some residual spending of the risk equalization model, (2) unpriced risk heterogeneity exists 
both in morbidity and in non-morbidity groups, and (3) unpriced risk heterogeneity increases with predicted spending by 
the risk equalization model. These findings imply that the sophisticated Dutch risk equalization model does not completely 
remove unpriced risk heterogeneity. Further improvement of the model should focus on broadening and refining the current 
set of morbidity-based risk adjusters.
Keywords Health insurance · Risk equalization · Risk selection · Survey data
JEL Classification I10-health · G22-insurance · Insurance companies · Actuarial studies · H51-government expenditures and 
health
Introduction
Many countries have based their health insurance system on 
principles of regulated competition [18]. In these systems, 
health insurers compete on price (i.e., the premium) and 
quality (e.g., in terms of the contracted provider network) 
within a regulatory framework set by the government. This 
regulatory framework aims to achieve public goals, such as 
individual affordability and accessibility. Common regula-
tory measures include standardization of the benefits pack-
age, premium-rate restrictions, open enrollment and risk 
equalization [7, 20].
One of the main challenges in regulated health insurance 
markets is to avoid risk selection [6, 11, 15, 18]. Risk selec-
tion has been defined as ‘actions by consumers and health 
plans to exploit unpriced risk heterogeneity and break pool-
ing arrangements’ ([13, emphasis added). Unpriced risk 
heterogeneity refers to predictable variation in health care 
spending not reflected in either premiums by insurers, or in 
risk equalization payments. The extent to which ‘unpriced 
risk heterogeneity’ is present in regulated health insurance 
markets depends heavily on the specific regulations in place. 
On the one hand, premium-rate restrictions, standardization 
of the benefits package and open enrollment introduce or 
increase unpriced risk heterogeneity. On the other hand, risk 
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equalization reduces unpriced risk heterogeneity by compen-
sating insurers for predictable variation in medical spending 
[12, 14, 19, 29]. This paper analyzes unpriced risk heteroge-
neity in the Dutch health insurance market.
Minimizing unpriced risk heterogeneity is a central objec-
tive in regulated health insurance markets, because risk 
selection has several unfavorable effects. First, risk selection 
might lead to inefficient health plan design [8]. For example, 
insurers do not have incentives to improve (or even main-
tain) the quality of the contracted care for subgroups that 
are known to be unprofitable. Secondly, risk selection might 
lead to price distortions and result in inefficient sorting of 
consumers across health plans [4]. For example, if unprofit-
able individuals (e.g., those with particular pre-existing con-
ditions) tend to sort into high-quality plans, the incremen-
tal premium for these plans does not only reflect the better 
quality of these plans but also captures some unpriced risk 
heterogeneity, which distorts consumers’ price/quality trade-
off when choosing a health plan. Thirdly, risk selection may 
reduce efficiency in production if it is a more effective way 
of reducing costs than negotiating and contracting efficient 
care. Finally, risk selection may reduce cross-subsidization 
from low-risk to high-risk individuals when these risk types 
are concentrated in different health plans (e.g., high- ver-
sus lower-quality plans, see previous example). Incomplete 
cross-subsidization might lead to compromised accessibil-
ity and affordability and violates the level playing field for 
insurers [19, 25, 26, 29].
Although risk equalization systems have become more 
sophisticated over the past decades, they still do not com-
pletely compensate for predictable variation in medical 
spending. Consequently, given premium-rate restrictions, 
unpriced risk heterogeneity is still present [1, 6, 9, 11, 15, 
18, 24]. The Dutch risk equalization model, for instance, has 
been greatly improved over the last decade but still leads to 
significant under- and overcompensations on specific groups 
[21]. For example, in 2008, the subgroup of individuals who 
reported a fair or (very) poor health status in the prior year 
(23% of Dutch population) was undercompensated by on 
average 607 euros per person per year. As a result of the 
introduction of new risk adjusters, however, the average 
undercompensation for this group reduced to 390 euros in 
2016. The same pattern can be observed for other subgroups. 
So, despite marked improvements of the Dutch model, some 
unpriced risk heterogeneity remains [24, 27–29].
The current over- and undercompensations suggest that 
the Dutch risk equalization model does not sufficiently 
identify the risk profile of individuals. More specifically, 
the morbidity-based risk adjusters in the risk equaliza-
tion model (see below) might (1) not identify all high-risk 
individuals and/or (2) not homogenously classify high-risk 
individuals. Both issues are probably present in the Dutch 
risk equalization model. Take, for instance, the risk adjuster 
‘pharmacy-based cost groups’ (PCGs), which classifies indi-
viduals in morbidity groups based on the use of prescribed 
drugs (related to chronic illness) in the prior year. For most 
PCGs, individuals must have used at least 181 defined daily 
doses (DDD) in order to be classified in a relevant PCG [29]. 
On the one hand, PCGs might not identify all people with a 
particular chronic condition because some of these people 
might have used less than 181 DDDs in the prior year. On 
the other hand, PCGs might be heterogeneous in the sense 
that individuals who use 365 DDDs of a specific drug may 
be sicker than those who used slightly more than 181 DDDs. 
Because of both reasons, insurers might not receive the right 
compensation for specific subgroups.
This paper further examines unpriced risk heterogeneity 
in the Dutch basic health insurance market. Since premiums 
for the basic health insurance in the Netherlands are com-
munity-rated per health plan, the risk equalization scheme is 
the main factor influencing unpriced risk heterogeneity. By 
studying unpriced risk heterogeneity, directions for further 
improvement of the risk equalization model may emerge, 
which in turn could further mitigate potential for risk selec-
tion. For example, unpriced risk heterogeneity within mor-
bidity groups (as identified by the risk adjusters in the risk 
equalization model) might call for refinement of existing 
morbidity-based risk adjusters, while unpriced risk hetero-
geneity in non-morbidity groups (as identified by the risk 
adjusters in the risk equalization model) might call for a 
broader set of morbidity-based risk adjusters.
Identification of unpriced risk heterogeneity requires 
‘external’ information on health risk, i.e., risk indicators that 
do not explicitly serve as risk adjusters in the risk equali-
zation model. Since the Dutch risk equalization model is 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the 
residual spending for risk classes explicitly included in the 
model is zero by definition, implying that the variation in 
spending between these classes will be compensated for 
completely. Of course, (some of the) variation in spending 
within risk classes will remain. Without external information 
on risk, however, it is impossible to determine to what extent 
this variation in spending is predictable.
In this study, the administrative data (2013) that were used 
to calculate the coefficients of the risk equalization model of 
2016 are enriched with external data from a large health sur-
vey administered in 2012 (n ≈ 387,000). The administrative 
data are used to replicate the Dutch risk equalization model 
of 2016 and to determine individual-level residual spending. 
Subsequently, the health survey data are used to develop a 
model to explain and predict individual-level residual spend-
ing. Unpriced risk heterogeneity is then examined using two 
metrics: (1) the correlation between (actual) residual spend-
ing and predicted residual spending across risk classes and 
(2) the mean absolute value of predicted residual spending 
generated by this prediction model. The latter is calculated 
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for the entire sample as well as for specific risk classes dis-
tinguished by the risk equalization model.
This study is not the first to use a large health survey to 
explain individual-level variation in medical spending. Ellis 
et al. [5] use a large health survey from Australia to assess 
the added value of health survey information in explaining 
individual-level variation in medical spending. Our study 
differs from Ellis et al. [5] in that it investigates the added 
value of health survey information in explaining variation 
in residual spending of the risk equalization model, the dif-
ference thus being the incorporation of a risk equalization 
model. Our approach is similar to that of Lamers [10] and 
Stam et al. [17] who also studied the added value of health 
survey information in explaining residual spending of the 
risk equalization model. The risk equalization model used 
in our study, however, is more advanced and incorporates 
more information. Another difference with Lamers [9] and 
Stam et al. [17] is that the sample size of our health survey 
is much larger: 387k versus 15k in Lamers [9] and 23k in 
Stam et al. [17].
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first objective is to 
study the added value of information derived from a health 
survey in explaining residual spending of the Dutch risk 
equalization model 2016. The second objective is to examine 
unpriced risk heterogeneity within risk classes distinguished 
by the Dutch risk equalization model.
This paper is organized as follows. In “The Dutch health 
insurance market” a brief description of relevant aspects of 
the Dutch health insurance market is given. In “Data and 
methods” the data and methods are explained, followed by 
the “Results”. “Discussion” discusses these findings and 
“Conclusion” concludes.
The Dutch health insurance market
This section briefly describes the most relevant aspects of 
the Dutch health insurance system. For a more comprehen-
sive overview, see Van Kleef et al. [29] and Enthoven and 
Van de Ven [7]. Since this paper investigates unpriced risk 
heterogeneity under the Dutch risk equalization model of 
2016, the following description focuses on the situation of 
2016.
The analyses in this paper focus on the Dutch basic 
health insurance. In addition to the basic health insurance, 
there is a public insurance program for long-term care and 
a supplementary health insurance for health care services 
not included in the basic health insurance. The basic health 
insurance covers, among others, primary care, pharmaceuti-
cal care, inpatient and outpatient hospital care, and mental 
health care. For mental health care, a separate risk equali-
zation model is applied which will not be included in the 
analyses. Instead, this paper focuses on the risk equalization 
model for curative somatic care, which comprises about 90% 
of total medical spending under the basic health insurance 
[29].
The government is responsible for the development and 
improvement of the risk equalization model. In practice, 
insurers receive a contribution based on the risk character-
istics of their insured from a risk equalization fund. In addi-
tion to the community-rated premium paid to their insurer, 
insured pay an income-related contribution to the risk equal-
ization fund, often through their employer [7, 22].
The risk equalization model predicts medical spending 
using individual risk characteristics like age and gender, 
region, socioeconomic status, source of income and health 
indicators. The latter include seven classifications related to 
morbidity. The first classification comprises the pharmacy-
based cost groups (PCGs), consisting of 33 classes based on 
people’s use of medication in the previous year (see above). 
A person can be classified in multiple PCGs; individuals 
who do not reach the predetermined DDD threshold for the 
relevant pharmaceuticals are categorized in a separate class, 
i.e., ‘no PCG’ [29].
A second morbidity classification comprises the diag-
noses-based cost groups (DCGs), i.e., 15 classes based on 
specific inpatient and outpatient hospital diagnoses from the 
previous year. Insured with multiple diagnoses are catego-
rized in one class only, i.e., the one with the highest residual 
spending. People without any of the selected diagnoses are 
categorized in a separate category, i.e., ‘no DCG’ [29].
A third classification consists of the multiple-year high 
cost groups (MHCGs) comprising 7 classes based on the 
level of spending for curative somatic care in the previous 
3 years. The underlying assumption is that individuals with 
multiple-year high costs most likely suffer from a chronic 
illness. Individuals are categorized in one class only, i.e., 
the class with the highest spending. Individuals that are not 
classified in one of the seven MHCG classes are classified 
in a separate category, i.e., ‘no MHCG’ [29].
Another classification comprises the durable medical 
equipment cost groups (DMECGs). This risk adjuster clas-
sifies individuals on the basis of their use of specific durable 
medical equipment in the previous year, related to chronic 
conditions and consists of 10 classes. Individuals are classi-
fied in one class only, i.e., the one with the highest residual 
spending. Again, those without a DMECG are classified in 
a separate class, i.e., ‘no DMECG’ [29].
The last three classifications are all based on prior-year 
spending for specific types of health care, i.e., physiotherapy, 
geriatric rehabilitation care and home care. The classifica-
tions based on physiotherapy and geriatric rehabilitation care 
spending both include 2 classes: yes/no spending in the pre-
vious year. The classification based on home care spending 
includes 7 classes; individuals are categorized in one class 
only, which is the class with the highest spending [3, 29].
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Data and methods
This section describes the data and methods used (1) to 
study the added value of information derived from a health 
survey in explaining residual spending of the Dutch risk 
equalization model 2016 and (2) to examine unpriced risk 
heterogeneity within risk classes distinguished by the Dutch 
risk equalization model 2016.
As mentioned in “Introduction”, identification of 
unpriced risk heterogeneity requires ‘external’ data (i.e., 
information about health risk that does not serve as the basis 
for risk adjuster variables). The reason is twofold. First, the 
mean residual spending for risk classes in the risk equaliza-
tion model is zero by definition, a property of OLS. This 
implies that the variation in spending between these classes 
will be compensated for completely. Of course, within risk 
classes variation in spending will remain, but without exter-
nal information it is impossible to determine to what extent 
this variation in spending is predictable. Second, greater var-
iation in spending within specific risk classes compared to 
others does not automatically indicate greater unpriced risk 
heterogeneity in these classes. This study relies on external 
information from a health survey conducted among a large 
sample of the adult Dutch population.
Two datasets are used in this study. First, we use admin-
istrative data containing individual-level information on 
medical spending and risk adjusters for all citizens with a 
basic health insurance in 2013 (n = 16.9 million). Second, 
health survey data from Statistics Netherlands are used con-
taining information on physical and mental health as well 
as on lifestyle for 387,195 individuals. The health survey 
data are restricted to individuals of 19 years or older (on 
September 1, 2012) who do not live in an institution. The 
sample results from a combination of three surveys held in 
2012, i.e., the elderly monitor (65 years and above), the adult 
monitor (19–64) and the health monitor (all ages) [30]. The 
two datasets are merged at the individual level using the 
citizen service number (i.e., personal ID number assigned to 
every Dutch citizen by the government). To protect individu-
als’ privacy, citizen service numbers were anonymized by a 
trusted third party before the datasets were made available 
for this research [24]. All analyses in this study (except the 
estimation of the risk equalization model) are conditional 
on the individuals who participated in the health survey and 
who successfully merged with the administrative data (see 
below).
We address the research objectives in four steps, which 
are explained in more detail below. First, we test the repre-
sentativeness of the sample. Second, we develop a predic-
tion model to explain residual spending with the information 
from the health survey. We use this model to make a predic-
tion of residual spending for all individuals included in the 
health survey. Third, we construct several groups for ana-
lyzing within-group risk heterogeneity not explained by the 
risk equalization model. Finally, we apply specific metrics to 
examine unpriced risk heterogeneity both at the individual 
level and at the level of specific groups.
Step 1: testing the representativeness of the sample
In this first step, the sample is compared with the adult 
population in terms of population frequencies for both risk 
classes included in the risk equalization model and deciles 
of spending (Table 1 and Fig. 1). In addition, the sample is 
compared in terms of mean spending per decile of spending 
(Fig. 2).  
Of the 387,195 respondents of the health survey, 384,004 
respondents successfully merged with the administrative 
dataset. The match is not 100% due to death and migra-
tion of citizens. Unfortunately, many records in the sample 
contain missing values for one or more crucial items in the 
health survey. After removing these records, 228,944 records 
remained for analysis.
Table 1 shows the prevalence for several risk classes 
included in the risk equalization model. The last column 
presents the prevalence for the total adult population with a 
health plan in 2013. The adjacent column shows the preva-
lence for the sample after removal of the missing values. It 
appears that the sample is overrepresented by the young, the 
healthy, the higher educated and high-income people.
Figure 1 compares both groups in terms of the preva-
lence per decile of spending. The deciles are based on the 
total Dutch adult population. The bars for the sample show 
a different pattern than the bars for the population and indi-
cate that the sample is overrepresented by people with low 
spending. As can be observed in Fig. 2, however, the average 
medical spending per decile of spending matches relatively 
well.
Recalibrating the survey data
Because the Dutch risk equalization model is estimated 
by OLS, the mean predicted spending equals the mean 
spending in the data on which the model is estimated. In 
other words, the mean residual spending in the population 
is zero. For the survey sample, however, the mean residual 
spending equals almost 65 euros per person per year (i.e., 
an overcompensation). The reasons for this deviation are 
that (1) the sample is relatively healthy (see Table 1 and 
Fig. 1) and that (2) apparently, the risk equalization model 
does not completely correct for this selection bias. In order 
to correct for this difference in mean residual spending 
between the sample and the population, we recalibrated the 
survey data by multiplying the individual-level predicted 
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spending by a factor of 0.967 (i.e., mean spending of 1928 
euros in the sample divided by the mean predicted spend-
ing of 1992 euros in the sample). After this correction, the 
mean residual spending in the sample equals zero. Without 
this correction, our measures of unpriced risk heteroge-
neity would be affected by the overcompensation on the 
sample.
Step 2: building a model to explain and predict 
residual spending
Next, we built a model to explain and predict residual 
spending from the risk equalization model. To do so, we 
first determined the individual-level residual spending ei by 
calculating the difference between spending yi and predicted 
spending by the risk equalization model ŷi:
(1)ei = yi − ŷi
Table 1  Prevalence of risk classes: survey sample vs adult Dutch population
*Statistically significant different from adjacent figure (P < 0.05)
Survey sample 
(%)
Adult 
population 
(%)
Age/gender Man, 0–17 years – –
Man, 18–34 years 13.2* 11.8
Man, 35–44 years 9.9* 8.7
Man, 45–54 years 10.6* 9.8
Man, 55–64 years 8.9* 8.4
Man, 65 years and older 8.3* 10.1
Woman, 0–17 years – –
Woman, 18–34 years 13.7* 11.8
Woman, 35–44 years 9.6* 8.8
Woman, 45–54 years 10.3* 9.8
Woman, 55–64 years 8.1* 8.4
Woman, 65 years and older 7.3* 12.4
Region Cluster 1–5 48.5* 50.2
Cluster 6–10 51.5* 49.8
Source of income Younger than 18 or older than 64 years 15.6* 22.4
Full disability benefits 0.3* 0.4
Partial disability benefits 4.1* 5.4
Social security benefits 2.2* 3.6
Student higher education 5.2* 3.6
Self-employed 5.2* 5.5
Higher educated 7.8* 4.8
Other (including salaried employment) 59.5* 54.4
Socioeconomic status Living on an address with > 15 people (SES-class 0) 0.1* 1.1
Income decile 1–2 (SES-class 1) 15.5* 19.7
Income decile 3–4 (SES-class 2) 18.5* 19.8
Income decile 5–7 (SES-class 3) 31.9* 29.8
Income decile 8–10 (SES-class 4) 34.1* 29.6
Pharmacy-based cost groups Categorized in at least one PCG 20.1* 24.1
Diagnosis-based cost groups Categorized in a DCG 9.8* 11.5
Multiple-year high cost groups Categorized in an MHCG 5.4* 7.1
Durable medical equipment cost groups Categorized in a DMECG 0.8* 1.1
Physiotherapy spending in the previous year Physiotherapy spending in the previous year 2.3* 2.6
Home care spending in the previous year Home care spending in the previous year 1.1* 2.6
Geriatric rehabilitation care spending in the 
previous year
Geriatric rehabilitation care spending in the previous year 0.1* 0.3
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Secondly, we use the information from the health sur-
vey to explain variance of ei . This model was developed in 
three phases: A, B and C. In phase A, we estimated a model 
including all variables (i.e., 56) available in the health sur-
vey as predictors. To fully exploit the information from the 
health survey, in phase B we identified relevant interaction 
terms. As many interactions are possible, we used a clas-
sification tree analysis to identify the statistically signifi-
cant interaction terms. A classification tree explores higher-
order interactions to explain a binary outcome variable [16]. 
Buchner et al. [2] have used a similar technique to identify 
relevant interaction terms for the German risk equalization 
model. In this study, the binary outcome is having a posi-
tive (1) or negative prediction error (0) based on the model 
from phase A. This way, the classification tree only yields 
interaction terms that can explain additional variance in ei 
(i.e., variance that is not yet explained by the model from 
phase A). In phase C, the interaction terms were added 
to the model from phase A and, using stepwise selection, 
statistically insignificant variables (P > 0.1) were dropped. 
This ultimately led to our final model, which includes 33 
variables including three interaction terms (see “Appendix 
A”). This model is used to predict individual-level residual 
spending from the risk equalization model:
Step 3: constructing groups for analyzing 
within‑group unpriced risk heterogeneity
In the third step, two types of risk groups were constructed: 
(1) groups based on yes/no morbidity, and (2) groups based 
on deciles of predicted spending by the risk equalization 
model ( ̂yi ). Morbidity is defined as being classified in at 
least one of the seven morbidity-based risk adjusters of the 
risk equalization model (see “The Dutch health insurance 
market”). Non-morbidity is defined as being classified in 
none of the seven morbidity characteristics of the Dutch 
risk equalization model. The deciles of predicted spending 
result in ten groups based on the predicted spending ŷi . More 
specifically, we determined deciles of ŷi for the entire adult 
Dutch population. These deciles thus order the individuals 
in the sample according to the predicted spending by the 
risk equalization model. This is a different way to analyze 
the relationship between unpriced risk heterogeneity and the 
risk information included in the risk equalization model.
Step 4: examining unpriced risk heterogeneity
In the final step, unpriced risk heterogeneity is exam-
ined at the individual level and at the level of the groups 
defined in step 3. Because the sample is overrepresented 
by healthy individuals, any unpriced risk heterogeneity 
found probably underestimates the actual unpriced risk 
heterogeneity. To indicate individual-level unpriced risk 
heterogeneity, we calculate the R21 and cummings pre-
diction measure (CPM)2 of our prediction model from 
step 2. In addition, we examine the distribution of the 
(individual-level) predicted residual spending. To indi-
cate unpriced risk heterogeneity per group, two metrics 
were used. First, the correlation between the individual-
level residual spending ei and individual-level predicted 
residual spending êi per group was calculated. This cor-
relation indicates the cohesion between residual spending 
and predicted residual spending. In a situation where risk 
(2)êi = b0 + b1Xi,1 +⋯ + b33Xi,33
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−ê
i
)
∑n
i=1
(e
i
−ê)
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equalization completely compensates for predictable varia-
tion in spending, residual spending will not be predictable. 
In that case, the correlation coefficient will be zero (or at 
least not statistically significant). Note that because we use 
a sample of the population, random variation is present. 
We are, however, interested in systematic variation. This is 
identified by testing for statistical significance. A statisti-
cally significant correlation coefficient indicates unpriced 
risk heterogeneity.
The second metric is the mean absolute value of pre-
dicted residual spending per group j:
Again, in a situation where risk equalization completely 
compensates for predictable variance in spending, residual 
spending is not predictable. In that case, the mean abso-
lute value of predicted residual spending will be (close to) 
zero. A higher value of || ̄̂e||j , indicates more unpriced risk 
heterogeneity. We deliberately examine the absolute values 
of predicted residual spending and not the relative amount 
of heterogeneity that can be explained by the prediction 
model (e.g. || ̄̂e||j as a percentage of |ē|j ), as incentives for 
risk selection are primarily determined by absolute differ-
ences between spending and revenues.
Results
This section presents the results of the empirical analy-
ses. “Unpriced risk heterogeneity in the total sample” 
focusses on unpriced risk heterogeneity in the entire sam-
ple and “Unpriced risk heterogeneity within risk groups” 
on unpriced risk heterogeneity in specific groups. Finally, 
“Predicted residual spending and predicted spending” 
(3)|| ̄̂e||j =
1
nj
∑
ij
|
| êi
|
|
studies the relationship between unpriced risk heterogene-
ity and predicted spending by the risk equalization model.
Unpriced risk heterogeneity in the total sample
When explaining variance in medical spending, the predic-
tion model constructed based on health survey variables (see 
“Step 2: Building a model to explain and predict residual 
spending”) yields an R2 of 10.2%. The same model has an R2 
of 0.48% when explaining variance in residual spending of 
the risk equalization model of 2016. This indicates that the 
risk equalization model already performs well in reducing 
unpriced risk heterogeneity. This conclusion is reinforced 
when comparing the above mentioned R2 values to the R2 
of the risk equalization model itself: 28.1%. This also shows 
that the information in the health survey is able to explain 
only a portion of the variance in residual spending of the 
Dutch risk equalization model of 2016. The same conclusion 
arises when we look at the CPM which equals 0.97% for the 
prediction model explaining variance in residual spending of 
the risk equalization model compared to 30.5% for the risk 
equalization model itself. Still, the results indicate that after 
risk equalization some unpriced risk heterogeneity remains.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the predicted residual 
spending resulting from our prediction model ( ̂ei ) in the total 
sample. If the risk equalization model would perfectly com-
pensate for predictable variation in medical spending, the 
prediction model would not be able to predict any residual 
spending. This would result in a very narrow distribution. 
The wider the distribution, the better the model predicts 
residual spending and the more unpriced risk heterogeneity 
is present. Figure 3 indeed indicates presence of unpriced 
risk heterogeneity in the sample. Figure 4 shows the same 
distribution separately for the morbidity group and the non-
morbidity group. The distribution is clearly wider for the 
morbidity group (panel 4a) than for the non-morbidity group 
Fig. 3  Distribution of predicted 
residual spending for the total 
sample
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(panel 4b), indicating a higher level of unpriced risk het-
erogeneity in the morbidity group than the non-morbidity 
group. This ‘width’ of the distribution can be quantified 
using the mean absolute value of predicted residual spend-
ing: || ̄̂ei||.
Unpriced risk heterogeneity within risk groups
Table 2 provides information on unpriced risk heterogeneity 
within the morbidity and non-morbidity groups as defined 
in “Step 3: constructing groups for analyzing within-group 
unpriced risk heterogeneity”. For all groups, we find a sta-
tistically significant positive correlation between residual 
spending and predicted residual spending. Unsurprisingly, 
the average spending is higher for the morbidity group than 
for the non-morbidity group. The same is true for the mean 
absolute value of residual spending |ē|j , indicating greater 
unexplained spending variation in the morbidity group as 
compared to the non-morbidity group (i.e., heteroskedas-
ticity). Note, however, that |ē|j not necessarily indicates 
‘unpriced risk’ because variation in residual spending is not 
necessarily predictable. Therefore, the mean absolute value 
of predicted residual spending || ̄̂e||j is much more interesting. 
This value indicates the extent to which the health survey 
variables in the prediction model (which are omitted from 
the risk equalization model itself, see “Step 2: building a 
model to explain and predict residual spending”) are able to 
explain residual spending from the risk equalization model 
of 2016. The last column of Table 2 shows that || ̄̂e||j is larger 
than zero for the morbidity and non-morbidity groups, indi-
cating the presence of unpriced risk heterogeneity in both 
groups. The results show that || ̄̂e||j in the morbidity group is 
almost twice as high as in the non-morbidity group, imply-
ing more unpriced risk heterogeneity in the morbidity group. 
These findings correspond with Fig. 4. A deeper look into 
the constituent elements of the morbidity group (i.e., the 
PCGs, DCGs, etc.) reveals that the largest values of || ̄̂e||j are 
found in the classifications based on geriatric rehabilitation 
care spending and home care spending in the previous year.
Table 3 shows the same metrics as Table 2, only then 
for the ten deciles of predicted spending based on the risk 
Fig. 4  Distribution of pre-
dicted residual spending for the 
morbidity group (a) and non-
morbidity group (b)
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Table 2  Unpriced risk heterogeneity with regard to morbidity and 
non-morbidity groups included in the risk equalization model 2016
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01
Group Estimate 
size of 
group (%)
Average 
spending ȳ
j
Correlation 
between e
i
 
and ê
i
|ē|
j
|
|
̄̂e||j
Morbidity
 Yes 26.4 4675 0.078*** 3596 383
 No 73.6 942 0.074*** 1073 203
PCG
 Yes 20.1 4833 0.085*** 3519 392
DCG
 Yes 9.8 7008 0.073*** 5433 490
DMECG
 Yes 0.8 12,885 0.120*** 7790 596
MYHCG
 Yes 5.4 10,613 0.101*** 6744 595
Physiotherapy t-1
 Yes 2.3 7256 0.118*** 4764 469
Geriatric rehabilitation t-1
 Yes 0.1 11,663 0.085* 8571 727
Home care t-1
 Yes 1.1 16,557 0.135*** 9363 765
Table 3  Unpriced risk heterogeneity with regard to 10 deciles of pre-
dicted spending based on the risk equalization model 2016
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01
Size of the 
group in the 
sample (%)
Average 
spend-
ing ȳ
j
Correlation 
between e
i
 
and ê
i
|ē|
j
|
|
̄̂e||j
Decile 1 14 422 0.036*** 467 181
Decile 2 10 540 0.085*** 635 189
Decile 3 13 775 0.073*** 881 190
Decile 4 9 984 0.076*** 1094 198
Decile 5 11 1085 0.071*** 1271 210
Decile 6 11 1448 0.087*** 1595 217
Decile 7 8 1679 0.078*** 1718 262
Decile 8 8 2290 0.078*** 2221 291
Decile 9 7 3590 0.083*** 3243 362
Decile 10 7 11,183 0.089*** 7577 623
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equalization model 2016. As described in “Data and meth-
ods”, these deciles are based on the total adult population, 
which is why the prevalence in the second column does 
not equal 10% for each class. Kautter et al. [9] also used 
deciles of predicted spending in their research, but then 
to evaluate model performance. In this research, the pur-
pose of the deciles of predicted spending is to order the 
included groups of the risk equalization model by risk 
class, enabling us to examine unpriced risk heterogene-
ity on a different level. For all risk classes, a statistically 
significant correlation between ei and êi is found. Both 
the mean absolute value of residual spending |ē|j and the 
mean absolute value of predicted residual spending || ̄̂e||j 
increase with predicted spending. The latter indicates more 
unpriced risk heterogeneity among individuals with the 
highest levels of predicted spending. This corresponds 
with the results from Table 2, which also showed that the 
groups with high (predicted) spending have higher levels 
of unpriced risk heterogeneity.
Predicted residual spending and predicted 
spending
Figure 5 shows the relation between unpriced risk heteroge-
neity and predicted spending from a different angle. On the 
horizontal axis, the deciles of predicted residual spending 
are depicted. Both the mean predicted residual spending ̄̂ej 
(shaded bars) and the mean predicted spending ̄̂yj (empty 
bars) per decile j of the risk equalization model are shown. 
This shows an interesting pattern: the two highest deciles of 
predicted residual spending also have the highest predicted 
spending by the risk equalization model. This suggests that 
for people with the highest predicted residual spending, the 
risk equalization model already predicts high medical spend-
ing, only not high enough.
Discussion
A major challenge in regulated health insurance markets is 
to avoid risk selection, which can occur in the presence of 
unpriced risk heterogeneity. Risk equalization models aim 
to mitigate unpriced risk heterogeneity by compensating 
insurers for predictable variation in medical spending. In 
this paper, we examined unpriced risk heterogeneity in the 
Dutch basic health insurance market. Our findings comprise 
three main conclusions, which are discussed below.
Health survey information indicates unpriced risk 
heterogeneity
We examined unpriced risk heterogeneity within risk groups 
included in the risk equalization model. To that end, we 
merged administrative data on spending and risk character-
istics of 2013 for the entire adult Dutch population with rich 
health survey data from 2012. With the information from 
the health survey, a prediction model was constructed to 
explain and predict residual spending from the risk equaliza-
tion model. The health survey information is able to explain 
approximately 10% of variation in individual-level medi-
cal spending. Ellis et al. [5] found a similar R2 of 10% for 
a model based on external health survey information to 
explain variance in individual-level medical spending in 
Australia. When explaining variation in residual spending 
(i.e., after application of the Dutch risk equalization model 
2016), the R2 drops to 0.48%, given these data, indicating 
that the health survey information is able to explain a small 
but non-negligible share of this variation. This confirms 
that although the Dutch risk equalization model 2016 per-
forms quite well, some unpriced risk heterogeneity—and 
thus potential for risk selection—remains. These findings 
are in line with previous research. Recent studies on risk 
heterogeneity by Newhouse et al. [15] and Van de Ven et al. 
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[23] also show that there is still selection potential in mar-
kets with sophisticated risk equalization models. In addi-
tion, Stam et al. [17], who analyzed the predictive power of 
self-reported health measures for a risk equalization model 
that already included several morbidity characteristics (i.e., 
PCGs and DCGs), also found that these self-reported health 
measures have added value in explaining medical spending. 
The R2 of 0.48% found in this study is lower than the incre-
mental change in R2 of 2%, found by Stam et al. [17]. This 
difference can be explained by improvements of the Dutch 
risk equalization model over the past decade [24, 27, 28].
Unpriced risk heterogeneity is present 
in both morbidity and non‑morbidity groups
Our findings indicate that unpriced risk heterogeneity is 
present in both the morbidity group and the non-morbidity 
group included in the risk equalization model. In addition, 
our findings suggest more unpriced risk heterogeneity in the 
morbidity group than the non-morbidity group. In line with 
the latter finding, unpriced risk heterogeneity increases with 
predicted spending by the risk equalization model. These 
results lead us to the conclusion that per-person predict-
able profits and losses (i.e., over- and undercompensations) 
are larger in the morbidity group than in the non-morbidity 
group and increase with predicted spending. Apparently, the 
high-risk group identified by the morbidity indicators in the 
risk equalization model is to some extent heterogeneous. 
This calls for further refinement of these indicators, to the 
extent that remaining unpriced risk heterogeneity in these 
groups is considered a problem.
When it comes to selection potential, however, not just 
the per-person predictable profits and losses matter, but also 
the size of the relevant group. Although the per-person pre-
dictable profits and losses are smaller in the non-morbidity 
group compared to the morbidity group, the former group is 
larger. Therefore, unpriced risk heterogeneity in this group 
should not be neglected. It appears that the morbidity indica-
tors do not identify all high-risk individuals and leave some 
of these people in the non-morbidity group, which calls for 
extending the set of morbidity indicators.
Relationship between predicted residual spending 
and predicted spending
Our findings also suggest a relationship between pre-
dicted residual spending (following from our prediction 
model) and predicted spending by the risk equalization 
model: those with the highest predicted residual spending 
also have high predicted spending. This shows that the 
risk equalization model predicts high spending for these 
individuals, only not high enough. One option to reduce 
undercompensation for specific groups is to extend the risk 
equalization model with new risk adjusters that identify 
these groups [19]. When new or better risk adjusters are 
not available (in the short run), another option to reduce 
undercompensation for specific groups is overpaying indi-
viduals on the basis of their predicted spending from the 
risk equalization model. Such overpayment can be real-
ized by, for instance, the use of constrained least squares 
regression [8, 25].
Limitations
The findings in this paper must be viewed in the light of 
some limitations. First, missing values in the health survey 
data necessitated the exclusion of approximately 150,000 
individuals from our analyses. Nonetheless, a substantial 
sample size of over 200,000 individuals remained. A sec-
ond limitation may be overfitting as a result of the use of a 
classification tree to identify relevant interactions between 
health survey variables (to enrich our prediction model). 
However, our main aim in identifying interactions was to 
optimally use the health survey information in explaining 
residual spending (and thus to indicate remaining unpriced 
risk heterogeneity), and not to develop potential new risk 
adjusters to include into the risk equalization model. Moreo-
ver, adding the identified interactions to the prediction model 
only marginally increases the R2 of this model (i.e., from 
0.45% to 0.48%), suggesting that the non-interaction vari-
ables explain the vast majority of the variation in residual 
spending explained by the prediction model. Thirdly, in 
this research the information from the health survey was 
used to explain variation in residual spending of the risk 
equalization model. Alternatively, the information from the 
health survey could have been added to the risk equaliza-
tion model and this extended model could then have been 
compared to the original risk equalization model, similar to 
the approach of Stam et al. [17]. The reason for choosing the 
first approach lies in the risk of overfitting. Despite having a 
large sample, the number of people that would be classified 
in specific categories of the risk equalization model would 
be too small to yield trustworthy estimates.
Finally, in this research the potential for risk selection has 
been explored by examining the existence of unpriced risk 
heterogeneity. It is important to note that the potential for 
risk selection does not depend on the existence of unpriced 
risk heterogeneity alone. As recognized in the definition of 
risk selection by Newhouse [13], unpriced risk heterogeneity 
is just one of the conditions that need to be present in order 
for risk selection to take place. The other conditions relate 
to ‘actions by consumers or health plans’ [13]. This includes 
all possible actions by insurers, regardless of intentions, to 
exploit unpriced risk heterogeneity as well as the response 
of consumers to these actions.
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Conclusion
This study examined the unpriced risk heterogeneity in the 
Dutch health insurance market. The analyses yield three 
main findings: (1) the health survey information is able 
to explain some residual spending of the risk equalization 
model, (2) unpriced risk heterogeneity exists in both morbid-
ity and non-morbidity groups, and (3) unpriced risk hetero-
geneity increases with predicted spending by the risk equali-
zation model. These findings imply that—despite its broad 
set of morbidity-based risk adjusters—the Dutch risk equali-
zation model 2016 does not completely remove unpriced 
risk heterogeneity. Further improvement of the model should 
focus on broadening the current set of morbidity-based risk 
adjusters (to reduce unpriced risk heterogeneity in the large 
non-morbidity group) and on refinement of the current mor-
bidity-based risk adjusters (to reduce unpriced risk hetero-
geneity in the morbidity group), if improvement for these 
groups is desired through risk equalization.
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Appendix A: Prediction model
Variable Coefficient
Intercept − 29
Fair or (very) poor general health 453
Cancer in the last 12 months 381
Heart condition in the last 12 months 576
Variable Coefficient
Stroke in the last 12 months 1041
Interaction term 1* 2439
Interaction term 2* 1479
Severe/recurrent disease of intestines in the last 
12 months
269
Immigrant of the first generation − 224
Other chronic illness in the last 12 months 153
Sufficient physical activity according to ‘fit’ norm − 116
3 self-reported conditions 220
Moderate smoker 136
Stroke ever 273
Semi-sufficient physical activity according to ‘fit’ norm − 82
Loneliness on a social level − 129
OECD limitations in hearing 210
High risk of incurring anxiety disorder or depression − 294
Peripheral artery disease in the last 12 months 232
Heavy smoker 154
Psoriasis in the last 12 months 158
Loneliness, moderately 77
OECD limitations in mobility 121
Interaction term 3* 359
Diabetic − 150
Sufficient physical activity according to ‘beweeg’ norm − 138
Heavy drinker 92
Severe/recurring dizziness in the last 12 months 139
Semi-sufficient physical activity according to ‘beweeg’ 
norm
− 100
2 self-reported conditions 67
Severe/recurring condition of back in the last 
12 months
− 80
High educated 48
Obese 65
OECD limitations in sight 103
All variables are statistical significant at P < 0.1
R2 of model is 0.0048
R2 of model without interactions is 0.0045
*Interaction terms
Interaction term N (weighted)
1 Chronic illness * OECD limitations in mobility * 
no asthma 12 months * no low risk of incurring 
anxiety disorder or depression * no joint inflam-
mation 12 months * cancer 12 months
9966
2 Chronic illness * no OECD limitations in mobility 
* no severe/recurring condition of neck in the 
last 12 months * no low risk incurring anxiety 
disorder or depression* no joint inflammation 
12 months * other chronic illness 12 months * 
cancer 12 months
26,416
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Interaction term N (weighted)
3 Chronic illness * no OECD limitations in mobility 
* no severe/recurring condition of neck in the 
last 12 months * high risk of incurring anxiety 
disorder or depression* no fair or (very) poor 
general health
57,790
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